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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
.JERRY W. McGUFFEY,

Petitioner-Respondent,

-vs-

. JOHN W. TURNER, Warden,
Utah State Prison,
Respondent-Appellant.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

---------y W. McGUFFEY,

------:

PetitionerRespondent,
Case No. 10561

w.
on,

TURNER,
Utah State
RespondentAppellant.

.

-- - - - - - - - - The Attorney General wishes to supplement the

ef heretofore filed on behalf of the appellant

ilie instant matter.

The Attorney General respectfully calls to the
rt's attention the decision of the Utah Supreme
tin State v. Seymour, No. 10596, wherein this
t ruled that in the absence of a showing of preice, failure to provide counsel for a defendant
the time of preliminary hearing was not a denial
~nstitutional rights or otherwise prejudicial

or.

Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
RONALD N. BOYCE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
JERRY W. McGUFFEY,
Pe ti tioner-Responden t,
- vs JOHN W. TURNER, Warden,
Utah State Prison,
Respondent-Appellant.

Case No.
10561

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, John W. Turner, Warden of the
Utah State Prison, appeals from a judgment of the
District Court of the Third Judicial District, conditionally releasing the respondent, Jerry W. McGuffey,
::i prisoner at the Utah State Prison, and ordering that
McGuffey be returned to the Sixth Judicial District,
Kane County, to stand trial on the charge of robbery.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On September 13, 1965, Jerry W. McGuffey
Plead guilty to the crime of robbery in the District
Court of the Sixth Judicial District, Kane County,
State of Utah, before the Honorable Ferdinand Erickson, District Judge. On the 22nd day of September .

2
1965, he was sentenced to be committed to the Utar
State Prison, Thereafter, on November 22, 1965, th6
respondent filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus
in the District Court of the Third Judicial Distric
Salt Lake County, alleging in his petition that th:.
plea of guilty entered before the District Court o:
the Sixth Judicial District had been coerced and th0:
he had been denied his rights to counsel at the time
of his preliminary hearing before the magistrate ir
the justice's court in Kane County. An answe:
to the petition for writ of habeas corpus was
duly filed and hearing held thereon. Witnesse~
were called for both re s p on dent and ap
pellant. On the 7th day of February, 1966, the Hon·
orable Marcellus K. Snow entered his decision, 01
dering that the petitioner be released from the Uta 0
State Prison and returned to Kane County to stan~
trial on the charges of robbery. The court found tha:
the petitioner was not properly advised of his right:
to have counsel appointed prior to the preliminary
hearing without legal advice from counsel and th3·
his plea of guilty to the charge of robbery was er.
tered without counsel and with the reasonable belie:
that such plea was necessary to obtain the release
of his wife and prevent her prosecution for th'
crime of robbery.
On the 10th day of February, 1966, the distnc
court entered an amended order providing for ·
stay of release of the petitioner pending appeal an:
ordering his return for reprosecution within fiftef

3
days of affirmance by this court or fifteen days after
dismissal of any appeal.
On the 16th day of February, 1966, the appella~1t
warden filed a notice of appeal to this court. The
respondent filed a cross appeal on the 18th day 8I
February, 1966, appealing the amended order of the
court granting the stay of the release of Jerry W.
McGuffey, pending this appeal. Subsequently, this
court, upon motion of the respondent's new counsel,
denied an application for release pending appec.l
and bail. Consequently, the issues raised by the
cross-appeal are now moot.
The counsel for the respondent on appeal is
not the same counsel who tried the case in the Dlstrict Court of Salt Lake County on the respondent's
application for a writ of habeas corpus.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent, Jerry W. McGuffey, a prisoner
in the Utah State Prison, filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in the District Court of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah. The petition and amended
petition alleged (1) the denial of counsel at preliminary hearing, (2) coercion inducing the petitioner
'.J enter his plea of guilty in the District Court of
Kane County, which plea resulted in his confinement in the Utah State Prison, and (3) that he was

4
not informed as to the consequences of his plea c:
guilty (R. 8). 1
At the time of hearing on January 19, 1966, c
transcript of the proceedings in the District Corn
for the Sixth I udicial District, in and for Kane County, were received into evidence (Exhibit 1). It ap
peared that at the time of the respondent's arraignment on the 13th day of September, 1965, he appeared without counsel, having theretofore waived
preliminary hearing (T. 2). An amended information
charging the respondent with the crime of robber/
was filed with the court. The respondent waived hls
right to arraignment in Kane County and the matter
was heard before the Honorable Ferdinand Erickson in Richfield, Sevier County. The court indicated
with reference to the charges then pending agains1.
the wife of the respondent that the charges wou!d
be dismissed. The court then advised the respondent
with reference to his right to counsel. The cour:
stated:
"The law of our State also provides, Jerry, that before 1
you are required to enter a plea to the Information '
charging you with the commission of a felony that
you are entitled to an attorney, whom you ma1
either employ on your own or in the event you are
unable financially to provide the funds, the court
may appoint one or is obliged to appoint one for you
to represent you. So do you want to employ one 0 ~
have the court appoint one for you?
DEFENDANT: No. sir."
(1)

The transcript of proceedings in the District Court for Kane C?~r
(Exhibit 1) will be referred to as "T." The proceedings in the DIS 1'
Court of Salt Lake County will be referred to as "R."
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On September 22, 1966, the respondent appeared before the court again and the district attorney recited that he had additional information to
the effect that the respondent had other charges
against him and had committed other crimes in other
parts of the United States. (T. 7-8). The court then
asked the respondent whether the statements by
the district attorney were true and respondent
indicated that they were (T. 10). After the indication
of the other involvement of the respondent, the judge
indicated that the respondent had fooled him (T. 11).
The respondent admitted that it was his purpose
to take money from the victim of the robbery and
that he would have taken whatever money she had
(T. 12). The court then .asked the respondent if he
1

21 The crime of robbery is actually punished by imprisonment in the Uta.h
State Prison for a period of five years to life. However, since the petitioner-respondent was advised that the penalty for the cri1n:e 'Yas more
severe than it actually was under th~ Utah sta~utes, n? pre)udice c:o~d
have resuled to him. Further, the tnal court did not m any way md1cate that its judgment ordering the releas~ of the petitioner-r~spondent
was predicated upon any erroneous advice as to the possible consequences of the plea of guilty.
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desired to consult with counsel before sentencing
and the respondent declined (T. 12). He was again
advised as to the penalty and further advised as to
his right to counsel, which he refused. The cour!
then entered a sentence committing the respondent
to the Utah State Prison.
At the time of the hearing on the respondent's
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, he testified
that he had been committed to the Utah State Prison
on the 22nd day of September, 1965, for the crime ol
robbery following his arrest in Kane County on September 8, 1965. (R. 34). He indicated that both his wife
and he were charged with the crime of robbery
(R. 35). Subsequent to his arrest, he was taken before
a justice of the peace (R. 35). He indicated that he
waived preliminary hearing (R. 36). He stated tha!
prior to preliminary hearing, he had a conversation
with the Sheriff and that the Sheriff advised him that
it would be better if he waived preliminary hearing.
(R. 36). He indicated that he could recali no statement from Justice of the Peace Hepworth, who is the,
justice before whom he appeared, except the state-;
ment to the effect that he was being bound over for '
trial. (R. 37). On cross-examination, he indicated that
he was never advised that he could have counse'.
if he could afford it, although there is some am·
biguity in his answers in the record (R. 49). He further
indicated that prior to the time of the preliminary
hearing, he had indicated to the Sheriff that he waE
guilty. He did admit that he waived preliminan
hearing (R. 49). He testified that subsequent to h;~
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waiver of preliminary hearing, he was bound over
to the district court and appeared there on the 13th
of September, 1965, and entered a plea to the charge.
He indicated that prior to appearing in open court,
he had a conversation with the Judge, the District
Attorney, and the Sheriff at which conversation his
wife was also present. He stated that probation was
discussed and it was indicated that if he entered a
plea of guilty he would be considered for probation (R. 38). He indicated that prior to that time, he
had had a discussion with the Sheriff of Kane County in the Kane County Jail at Kanab, Utah, and that,
more or less, the same thing was said. He further
indicated that it was stated that if he plead guilty,
the charges against his wife would be dropped (R.
39). He further indicated that there some mention about possibly expunging the record and obtaining his return to military service (R. 40-42). He
stated that the judge indicated that the case would
no be referred to the Adult Probation and Parole
Department, but that the Sheriff would make an examination and advise the court (R. 40). He further
testified that prior to the entry of his plea of guilty,
he had a conversation with the Sheriff as to the feasibility of obtaining counsel and that the Sheriff told
him that that would slow things up and that counsel
would have to come from Salt Lake (R. 41). He admitted that he was advised as to the consequences
of his plea and did not impeach the record as to its
recital that he was advised as to the right to have
counsel (R. 42).
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On cross-examination, it appeared that the re
spondent -had been convicted upon trial before a
special Court-martial in the United States Air
Force of AWOL under the Uni form Code ol
Military Justice and spent three months in
a military stockade (R. 47). The trial court took judicial notice of the legal proceedings in special courtm,artials (R. 48). He admitted that he was advised
that he could have a preliminary hearing to determine whether there was probable cause to see il
he was guilty. He further indicated that he wanted
to waive the preliminary hearing, because he felt
that he was guilty (R. 49-50). He stated that he was
never promised probation but it was merely indicated that he would be considered for it and that hG
understood. there was no guarantee (R. 51). He recognized that Judge Erickson had not promised him
probation (R. 51). He admitted that he was advised
as to the right to counsel and stated that he plead
guilty because "I didn't think it would be necessary
to .plead not guilty and that I wanted to waive jury
triq.L" m. 53-54). He stated that he had no doubt in
his mind as to the commission of the offense for
which he. was charged (R. 54). The question was
asked: "All right. Now, you plead guilty, knowing
that you had committed that offense, didn't you?
Answer: Yes." (R. 55).
. The respondent fu:rthEff testified that the charges
against -hjs ~wife, yvere 1_,in. fact, dropped. He further
said. he reali:t::ed,-:that going back into the service
d~pended on his.being accE3pted.
Patricia May McGuffey testified that she w0 5

9

the wife of the respondent and that prior to the tim0
he entered his plea of guilty, Sheriff Johnson had
indicated that if the respondent would plead guilty,
he might be able to get probation (R. 64). She didn't
recall whether there wa.s any mention of charges
against her and could not recall whether there wo.s
any questions asked at preliminary hearing about
an attorney (R. 64-65). Thereafter, after very leading
questions from the respondent's counsel, she indicated that she recalled a conversation concerning
dropping charges and the possibility of the respondent obtaining probation (R. 66-67). She stated that
there was no doubt in her husband's mind that if he
plead guilty, she wouldn't be prosecuted (R. 69). She
stated that there was a conversation prior to the time
he entered a plea of guilty with Judge Erickson, the
District Attorney, and the Sheriff being present,
where it was indicated that if the respondent plead
guilty, he would be considered for probation, and at
which time Judge Erickson also indicated that the
charges would be dropped against her if her husband plead guilty (R. 70). Mrs. McGuffey stated that
she was still in love with her husband (R. 69).
Sheriff LeNard Johnson of Kane County testified
that he was present at the time of the magistrate's
hearing. He said that the complaint was read and
that the respondent was advised of his right to an
attorney and that he could have an attorney at all
oroceedings, if he wanted it, including preliminary
hearing and that the district court would appom~
:Jne if he co u 1d n' t afford one. (R. 70). He
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indicated that the respondent had told
him prior to the time of preliminary hearing that hE
was guilty and wanted to waive a hearing and ge!
it over with (R. 70). Sheriff Johnson said that he advised the respondent prior to the time 0£ the preliminary hearing that he was entitled to counsel and
that he also advised that if he couldn't afford it, that
counsel would be appointed. (R. 73). At the time ol
preliminary hearing, the Sheriff indicated that the
respondent was advised again of his right to counsel and that counsel would be appointed if he
couldn't afford it (R. 70). Thereafter, the respondent
waived preliminary hearing.
The Sheriff indicated that subsequent to the
waiver 0£ preliminary hearing, the subject of prob1i- •
tion was discussed with the respondent, but that he
never advised him that he would get it and never i
advised him that he should plead guilty. The SheriE:
indicated, in fact, that he advised him on several i
occasions that he should plead not guilty and le1
the court determine the issue (R. 74-75). He indicated.
that at no time did he promise or indicate to the re :
spondent that he would get probation. The respondent at no time testified that the was promised probation.
The Sheriff stated that prior to the time of arraign·
ment in the district court, both the respondent and
his wife approached him and asked if there was a •
1
possibility that a dismissal could be obtained agains
the wife if the respondent plead guilty. He indicate~
that he didn't know, but that he would present the
1
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matter to the District Attorney (R. 79). He indicated
that he never advised the respondent that he should
plead guilty. He further indicated that there was no
agreement that if the respondent would plead guilty,
the charges against his wife would be dropped. He
stated that he felt the evidence simply did not support the charges against the wife and that the evidence seemed to indicate that she had been led
into the crime by her husband (R. 83). He stated that
he would have recommended dropping the charges
against the wife, even if there had been no guilty
plea entered.
The Sheriff further said that he never told McGuffey to waive counsel or that counsel would hav-3
to come from Salt Lake City.
The District Attorney, Ken Chamberlain, testified that he prosecuted Mr. McGuffey, that he first
saw Mr. McGuffey at the time scheduled for his arraignment on September 13, 1965, and that prior to
that time, he had had no discussions with the respondent (R. 87). He stated that there was a conversation in the chambers of I udge Erickson, at which
time he, the sheriff, the judge, and Mr. and Mrs. McGuffey were present. He stated that prior to that time,
the Sheriff had talked to him about possibility dismissing the charges against the respondent's wife.
m. 87). He stated that there was no arrangement or
agreement made to dismiss the charges against the
respondent's wife in exchange for a plea of guilty
by the respondent but that the evidence simply did
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not justify continuing to press the charges against
the respondent's wife because it appeared that Mrs.
McGuffey's involvement in the crime was becaus::
of the domination of her husband (R. 88). He furths:
indicated that there were no promises of probati01
by himself, the Sheriff, or the Judge, at this time. Mr.
Chamberlain further testified that it was not the practice to appoint counsel for indigents from Salt Lake
City, but, rather, to obtain counsel for them ir:
Richfield and that in his experience, he had never
seen counsel appointed from Salt Lake City (R. 90)
Mr. Chamberlain further testified that he had already
decided to dismiss the charges against respondent's
wife and that no condition that the respondent plead
guilty was placed upon such a dismissal (R. 92). He
stated that the respondent's plea was not a factor ir.
the dismissal of the charges. He catagorically statei.
that it was not reasonable to assume that Mr. Mc
Guffey had been under the impression that it was
necessary for him to plead guilty for the charge:.
to be dismissed against his wife and that at no time
had Judge Erickson made any promises in his pres
ence to the respondent.
1

Based upon the above evidence, the trial coUJ'
found that the respondent was entitled to a writ o:
habeas corpus based upon the failure to have coun
sel at the time of preliminary hearing and the clai:
that the respondent plead guilty in order to have the
charges_ against his wife dropped.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING
THAT THE RESPONDENT WAS ENTITLED TO A
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS BECAUSE OF HIS CONTENTION THAT HIS PLEA ENTERED AT THE TIME
OF ARRAIGNMENT IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
KANE COUNTY WAS INVOLUNTARY.

The appellant submits that the trial court committed error in finding that there was any irregularity or inpropriety at the time of the respondent's
plea of guilty entered to the crime of robbery in the
Sixth Judicial District Court for Kane County on September 13, 1965. The appellant submits that thG
::ourt erred in two particulars: First, that the court
~rred in finding that there was sufficient evidence
tJ sustain the respondent's burden of proof that he
was entitled to habeas corpus. Second, that the court
erred in that it misapplied the law in weighing
whether the respondent's plea of guilty was volur..tary.
It is well established that an individual seekwrit cf
demon3trate to the court that he is entitled to release. Exparte Riddle, 57 Cal.2d 848, 22 Cal.Rep. 472, 372 P.2d
304 (1962); 39 C.J.S., Habeas Corpus, sec. 100; 25 Am.
;.,r., Habeas Corpus, sec. 150. Consequently, it was
·::::umbent upon the respondent in the instant case
mg release from custody by petition for
~:J.beas corpus has the burden of proof to
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to carry the burden of proof to show that he was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.
Recently, courts have recognized that there is
an increasing use of the writ of habeas corpus to
make inquiry into procedures occurring at the time.
of trial or at the time of arraignment and that inquir1
under habeas corpus is broader in scope than it has
been previously, and it is not limited to the very ·
basic question of whether the individual having
custody of the petitioner is entitled to have custody.
because he is a person in proper authority, or tha\ ~
the individual having custody has jurisdiction to ex· i
ercise dominion over the person in custody. Be- ,
cause of the expanded use of writs of habeas corpus :
and the fact that they are often post-conviction re- !
trials of the issues previously heard by a court, ap·,
pellate courts have imposed a rather heavy burder: I
of proof upon an individual seeking release from !
custody by habeas corpus.
'
I

I

In Wilson v. Hand. 181 Kan. 483, 311 P.2d 1009
(1957), the Kansas Supreme Court stated with rel·:
erence to a habeas corpus proceeding:
"In this type of proceeding, the petitioner has ~he
burden of proving the grounds upon which he rehes ,
for his release *** and he must establish his allega·
tions by a clear and convincing preponderance of the
evidence because a judgment of conviction bears 8
presumption of regularity and validity.''

In Montgomery v. Hand. 183 Kan. 118, 325 P.2c
69 (1958), the Kansas Supreme Court again stated:
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"However, the burden was upon the petitioner to
prove by clear and convincing evidence the grounds
upon which he relies for his release."

In Application of Gaskill, 335 P.2d 1088 (Court
of Crim. App. Okla. 1959), the court noted:
"Moreover, to vacate a judgment and sentence by
habeas corpus for alleged denial of fundamental constitutional rights, where the judgment is regular on
its face, the proof must be clear, convincing and without doubt."

In In Re O'Neill, 359 P2d 619 (Court of Crim.
App. Okla. 1961), the court again indicated that in
order to justify the release of a petitioner, by habeas
corpus, the evidence showing a violation of constitutional rights must be clear and convincing. It
is noteworthy that the O'Neill case involved a claim
by a petitioner that his plea of guilty was coerced
because of threats by a county attorney that he
would be turned over to a mob unless he entered
a. plea of guilty.
In Farmer v. Raines, 276 P.2d 633 (Okl. Crim.
1962), the syllabus of the court indicated:
"Public policy demands that the charges of petitioner
in habeas corpus proceedings should be clear and convincing and should be corroborated by clear and convincing proof."

Thus, the courts are recognizing that in the absence of an obvious defect in the record of any proreedings, an individual seeking his release from
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custody by habeas corpus should demonstrate b
clear and convincing evidence that his detention l:
unlawful. Certainly, there must be a presumptio:
of judicial regularity and a recognition that wheE
an individual enters a plea of guilty he does s:
under circumstances which are not inherently coe;
cive. A defendant is before the court and can makec
statement in his own behalf and if it appears, as:
does in this case, that the respondent was cleafr
advised of his rights to counsel, it would seem to b
a matter of sound public policy to require the persc·
in custody to demonstrate by clear and convincinc
evidence that he is unjustifiably held.

It is submitted that in the instant case, the respondent in no way met the required burden l .
proof. In respect to the determination of the cou'
that the respondent's plea of guilty was in provider'·
ly entered, it is submitted that such a finding is nc,
supported by clear and convincing evidence ar.:
is contrary to the weight of testimony presented ; .
the time of trial.
First, the transcript of proceedings of tr.respondent's arraignment clearly indicates th a .
at the time he entered his plea of guilty, he was we
aware that the charges against his wife had bee'.
dropped. The district attorney amended the inforrr::
tion, and the court in questioning the responde
obtained the response of the respondent and hew>
aware of the fact the charges had been dropped. n
court thereafter very carefully advised the respor
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ent of his rights to appear in Kane County and the
respondent intelligently waived his appearance in
Kane County and entered his plea in Sevier County.
The court then went on to advise respondent that
before he was required to enter a plea to the informaion, that he was entitled to an attorney, and
the court stated: "Whom you may either employ on
your own, or in the event you are unable financially
to provide the funds, the court may appoint one or
is obliged to appoint one for you to represent you."
The court then asked the respondent if he desired
counsel and he stated: "No, sir." (T. 3). Thereafter.
the respondent was advised as to the penalty that
could be imposed by the court in the event the court
saw fit to do so. The information was read and the respondent was advised that he was entitled to time to
consider the matter before he entered a plea of guilty.
The respondent replied that he was ready to enter
his plea at that time. The court then asked the respondent how he plead to the information and he
replied: "Guilty, sir." (T. 4). Thereafter, the respondent's sentencing was delayed pending a determination as to his background and whether there were
any other charges pending against him. At the time
respondent appeared for sentencing, he was again
advised as to his right to counsel and again he
waived counsel. He was further advised, again, as
to the consequences of his plea and the possibility
that he could be incarcerated in the Utah State
Prison for a period of five years to life and after such
ci.dvice, the respondent still indicated that he did not
:lesire counsel.
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The District Attorney informed the court as 1c
prior difficulties the respondent had been involved
in, and the respondent admitted that the Districi
Attorney's statement was correct. At no time, doe1
it appear from the transcript, that the respondent, lu
any way, desired to have his plea set aside, nor dla
he at any time indicate that he was under coercim
or misapprehension. There is nothing in the tran
scripts of proceedings at the time of the respondent'~
arraignment or his sentencing that demonstrates an1
illegality.
At the time of the hearing, the respondent testi
fied that when he entered his plea of guilty, he rec
ognized that there was no promise of probation ana
that he would only be considered for probation.
Further, the trial court on habeas corpus made nc
finding to the effect that the respondent was under
any misapprehension as to the liklihood of his receiving probation if he entered a plea of guilty. Tnc
respondent stated that he had discussed the que&
tion of entering a plea of guilty with the District A:
torney, the Sheriff, and the Judge, immediately prior
to his arraignment (R. 38). The respondent further
testified that at this conference with the Judge, he
was told that he was entitled to counsel but tha!
counsel would have to come from Salt Lake Citl'
and that since he was being considered for proba
tion anyway, he didn't see where it was necessary
This was rebutted by t h e District Attorney
Further, the respondent indicated that he plea0,
guilty knowing he had committed the offense anc
might go to prison (R. 55). The respondent's wile
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testified that she was present at a pre-arraignment
meeting in chambers where the District Attorney,
the Sheriff, and the Judge and her husband were
also present. She indicated, at the outset, (R. 64), that
she didn't recall if there was anything mentioned
regarding any charges against her. She further indicated that she couldn't recall what Judge Erickson
had said specifically (R. 70). However, in other instances, she says that she recalled the conversation
concerning dropping the charges.

On the opposite side, the District Attorney testic fied that there was a conversation, but that at no
a time was there any indication to the respondent
that counsel would have to be brought from Salt
n.
ic
Lake City, nor was there any promise made to him.
;r The District Attorney indicated that the reason the
charges were dropped against the respondent's wife
e10
was because the case against her was weak. This
&
was corroborated by the Sheriff, who stated that the
l: original request to drop the charges against the reir
spondent's wife if he plead guilty, came from the
respondent himself. The Sheriff indicated that at no
31
e time did he advise the respondent to plead guilty,
1
a!
but to the contrary, had advised him several times
,
to plead not guilty and to get the matter heard by
11
a the court. He further stated that the respondent had
y indicated that he was guilty and would like to get
y it over with. The testimony of the Sheriff and the
District Attorney, both men with unimpeachable
10
backgrounds, was exactly to the opposite of that of
10
1e
the respondent. There is nothing in the record to

n
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support the respondent's contentions of duress or
coercion and, in addition, it should be remembered
that the respondent had previously been convicted
of a military offense and spent time in a military con.
finement facility. Further, he had committed several
other violations of law throughout the United States
which were committed at the time of the sentencinq, ,
which would tend to cast substantial doubt on his .
veracity.
With the posture of the evidence being such as
indicated above, it cannot be said that the respondent carried his burden to prove by clear and con· :
vincing evidence that he was entitled to release.
It is well established that where an individual ,
is fully advised of his rights and waives his right to '
counsel, there is no constitutional violation of the
right to counsel. State v. Spiers, 12 U.2d 14, 361 P.2d:
509 (1961). In the Spiers case, this court noted firs!!
that the burden of proof was upon the defendant to :
show that he had been denied his constitutional;
rights and stated:
I

"There was no evidence of fear or coercion, or any '
other reason why he was induced to waive his righ~, :
other than he thought the course he took was for his i
best good. There was nothing to indicate that at any :
stage of the proceedings he did not understand what
was going on, the questions asked or the effect ol
the waiver of counsel. In view of this situation, ~e
conclude that the trial court's finding that he intell~; 1
gently waived his right to counsel must be sustained.
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In the instant case, there is no evidence of any
fear or threats or coercion of any kind. The only
evidence before the trial court was that the respondent felt that the best course to follow would be to
plead guilty. Consequently, there was clearly an
intelligent waiver of the right to counsel and a voluntary plea of guilty.
In Busby v. Holman, 356 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1966),
two state prisoners serving life sentence in the Alabama State Penitentiary sought federal writs of
habeas corpus. Each had been charged with a capital
crime. One was charged with forceable rape, and
one had been charged with murder in the first degree. Each had plead guilty to the charges in reliance upon the prosecutor's promise that he would
not seek the death penalty. The prosecutor did not
seek the death penalty. The court indicated that
there was no basis for habeas corpus. The court
stated:
"The important thing is not that there shall be no
'deal' or 'bargain' but that the plea shall be genuine,
by a defendant who is guilty; one who understands
his situation, his rights and the consequences of his
plea and is neither deceived nor coerced."

In this case, there was no showing that the plea
of guilty entered by the respondent wasn't with fu~l
understanding as to the nature and consequences
of the plea. Even assuming the position taken by
the respondent that he plead guilty in order to obtain the dismissal of charges against his wife, it does
not appear that that plea was inprovident. Indeed,
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at the time of the sentencing, the respondent virtually admitted his guilt to the crime and did so again
at the time of the habeas corpus hearing. Consequently, there appears to be a plea by an individual
who was guilty and who fully understood the
reasons and circumstances surrounding the charges
against him. The fact that there may have been some
deal or bargain would not vituate the plea, if there
was no deceit or coercion. Since the charges were,
in fact, dismissed against the respondent's wife, i\
cannot be claimed that there is any basis for habeas
corpus.
In People v. Defulmer, 209 N.E.2d 93 (N.Y. 1965),
the court indicated that there was no violation of
due process for a court to receive a plea of guilty to
second degree murder and sentence a defendant
who is only fourteen years of age where the desire
was to avoid the consequences of a possible first
degree murder conviction and mandatory death
sentence. In this case, the respondent was twentythree years of age, was married, had had military
experience, had previously been before some form
of a judicial tribunal3 and, apparently, was fully advised by the court at the time the plea was entered
as to the nature and consequences of the plea.
·
Most recently, in Tipton v. State, 194 Kan. 705,
402 P.2d 310 (1965), the Kansas Supreme Court indi(3) The Uniform Code of Military Justice provides for an ru:rai~ent y,r~;
ceeding very comparable to that in the ~ederal courts m trials be
general, special, and summary courtmarbals. Manual for Courtm
1951 p. 107; 10 U.S.C., secs. 836-854.

artlal
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cated that the record did not substantiate the defendant's claim that his plea was coerced or that
the prosecution failed to carry out promises to attempt to obtain leniency.
In People v. Schiskie. 263 N.Y.S.2d 885 (N.Y.
1965), the court indicated that absent any oHicial deception and trickery, even though the defense attorney did advise the defendant to plead guilty and
that probation would be granted, it did not warrant
withdrawal of the plea of guilty.
In People v. Nooner, 46 Cal.Rep. 680 (1965), the
court upheld the decision of the trial court by refusing to allow the withdrawal of a plea of guilty,
based upon an agreement with the district attorney
to dismiss another charge. In doing so, the court
noted:
"This case is one of an increasing number involving a
trial by the defendant of our judges, district attorneys, and defense counsel."

It is submitted that much of the contentions of
the respondent at the time 0£ trial were merely accusaions against the court, the district attorney, and
the sheriff, which, but for his testimony, were not
supported by the evidence.

In Hulett v. Sigler. 242 F.Supp. 705 (Neb. 1965),
the court indicated that even though a guilty plea
was effected through negotiation with the district
attorney in order that an habitual criminal charge
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would be dropped, the circumstances were not that
they overcame the defendant's ability to make a voluntary decision and application for habeas corpus,
on the basis of a coerced plea, would not be sustained.
In In Re Garceau's Petition, 212 A.2d 633 (Vt.
1965), the defendant plead guilty and received the
sentence which the state's attorney recommended.
The court noted that he had a free choice to reject
the offer, and, apparently, plead guilty knowing the
consequences of his plea. Under these circum·
stances, the court said that the contention that the
plea was coerced could not be sustained.
In Queor v. State, 17 4 So.2d 687 (Ala. 1965), the
court indicated that an agreement worked out in ac·
cordance with an understanding between the defendan t and the prosecution that he would receive
a sentence of: life imprisonment, if he changed his
plea, does not amount to coercion. Plea bargaining
does not necessarily render a plea of guilty improvi·
dent or coerced. Quite to the contrary, plea bargain·
ing is very often the only means that a defense
counsel has to assist his client. Steinberg and Paulson, A Conversation with Defense Counsel, The
Problem of a Criminal Defense, ABA, pages 47-49
(1961).
In the case of State v. Plum, 14 U.2d 17 4, 378 P.2d
671 (1963), this court had before it a contention mad9
by a 23-year old defendant that the trial court had
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erred in refusing to allow him to change his plea ot
guilty after a deal had been made with the prosecutor that if he agreed to plead guilty, the prosecutor
would recommend probation .. This court noted that
the mere fact that a bargain is reached between thG
prosecutor and the defendant does not mean that
the plea was improvidently entered where the prosecutor otherwise carried out his end of the bargain.
This case is precedent for reversal in the instant
case.
In Cipes, Moore's Federal Practice (Rule~ of
Criminal Procedure ); para. 11.05 [4J, it is stated:
"Prosecutor promises to make some concession other
than a sentencing recommendation, such as dismissal
of a related indictment, or dismissal of certain counts
in the indictment to which the plea is made. Unlike
sentence, these are not matters within the exclusive
province of the court and the prosecutor will usually
be able to obtain the court's consent to dismissal. The
only question then is whether the prosecutor keeps
his promise."

Thus, if the charges are actually dismissed, it does
not appear that the courts will find that there has
been an improvident plea, if it was understandably
made. See also Kent v. United States, 272 F.2d 795
16th Cir. 1959).
In Holt v. United States, 329 F.2d 368 (7th Ctr.
1964), cert. denied 379 U.S. 992, the court ruled that
a plea was not coerced where there was a consent
to dismissal of one indictment in exchange for 'a
uloJ to another.
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In Martin v. United States. 256 F.2d 345 (5th Cir.
1958), the defendant plead guilty on certain charges
in exchange for a concession from the United States
attorney to dismiss a kidnapping count. The court
refused to find that the plea of guilty had been
coerced or was otherwise improvidently entered.
The court noted that the United States Supreme
Court had indicated in one case that "perhaps, a
plea of guilty induced in part by promises may
nevertheless be trustworthy." The court went on
to say:
"So far as we know, no court has held that anY such
concession made by the prosecution necessitates the
finding that a plea was involuntary. The crucial issue
appears to be whether, with all the facts before him,
including the advice of competent counsel, the plea
was truly voluntary. The Supreme Court lays down
no other test."

The court relied upon the decision of Traver v.
United States. 203 F.2d 948 (4th Cir. 1953), where the
court had found that entering a plea on two counts
in an indictment in consideration of the remaining
count being dismissed did not render the plea in·
voluntary. Many other cases so holding are collected in 35 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1.
Based upon the above authorities and assuming
that the court would believe the testimony of the
respondent over that of the Sheriff and District Attorney, it would still appear that the plea
which was en t e red by the respondent un·
circumstances where he heard and understood
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what was occurring was voluntary. In Re Johnson.
42 Cal.Rep. 228, 62 Cal.2d 325, 398 P.2d 420 (1965)
Under these circumstances, it appearing further
that there was substantial evidence of guilt which
would tend to support the very conclusion that the
respondent's plea was entered because of an acknowledgment of guilt as distinct from some other
reason, there is no legal basis for habeas corpus.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING
THAT THE PETITIONER WAS ENTITLED TO RELEASE UPON HABEAS CORPUS BECAUSE OF ANY
FAILURE OF PROPER ADVICE AT THE TIME OF PRELIMINARY HEARING.

The trial court apparently found that there was
some irregularity at the time the respondent appeared before the justice's court for preliminary
hearing, which irregularity was such as to warrant
his release by habeas corpus. It is submitted that
the decision of the trial court cannot be sustained
on two grounds. First, it is submitted that the evidence does not support the contention that the respondent was not properly advised as to his rights
to counsel at preliminary hearing and that he did
not properly waive preliminary hearing. Secondly,
it is submitted that a preliminary hearing is not a
"critical stage" at which the appointment of counsel
is necessary; and, consequently, under the facts and
circumstances of this case, there was no violation of
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the respondent's constitutional rights, even if he
were not afforded an opportunity to obtain counsel
at the time of preliminary hearing.
At the time of the hearing for collateral relief in
the trial court, the respondent testHied that he appeared before a Justice of the Peace for preliminary
hearing. He indicated that he didn't recall any evidence being given and that he did not have an a'torney. He testified that he did enter a waiver cf
preliminary hearing (R. 36). He stated that he did
have a conversation with the Sheriff prior to preliminary hearing and the Sheriff told -him that he
would be better off without a preliminary hearinc;.
The Sheriff testified· to the contrary, that he never
advised the respondent to waive preliminary hearing, but that the respondent indicated that he wc1s
guilty and he wanted to get it over with. Respondent indicated on direct examination that he did net
recall any other statement made by the justice of
the ·peace, except that.he was being bound over to
stand trial (R.. ::37)_,
,r ; -.
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whether there was probable cause to see if he wa'O
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hearing, he had told the sheriff that he was guilty
(R. 50).
Sheriff Johnson who was present at the time of
the preliminary hearing indicated that the respondent was advised of his rights to have a preliminary
hearing, of his rights to have counsel, and to have
counsel even if he was impecunious. The Sheriff
further testified that the Justice of the Peace advised
the respondent that the district court would appoint
counsel for him at all stages of the proceedings, including the preliminary hearing, and further, that
he also advised the respondent that he could have
counsel.
Mrs. McGuffey, who was also present at the
time of the preliminary hearing, did not, at the hearing on the habeas corpus petition, offer any testimony as to the lack of any advice as to the right to
counsel at the time of preliminary hearing.
Further, the District Attorney testified that counsel had been previouslv appointed in preliminary
hearings on criminal charges in Kane County in the
past (R. 95).
Thus, it appears that the only evidence going to
the question of whether the respondent was advised
of his rights to counsel at the time of preliminary
hearing was offered by the respondent himself and
was not, in any manner, corroborated.
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As noted from the authorities cited in Point I
of this brief, infra, page 15, the burden of proof
to demonstrate a violation of constitutional right entitling a petitioner to release by habeas corpus is
upon the petitioner and the burden must be met by
clear and convincing evidence.
In Wilson v. Hudspeth, 165 Kan. 666, 198 P.2d
165 (1948), the court in die a ted that the unsupported
and uncorroborated statements of the petitioner
given at a habeas corpus proceeding would not carry the burden of proving his entitlement to release
for violation of his constitutional rights.
In Flowers v. State, 90 Okl. Crim. 390, 214 P.2d
728 (1950), the Oklahoma court stated that in a habeas
corpus proceeding by an inmate of the prison to
obtain his release, that testimony from the inma:e
alone, or even when supported by the testimony of
another inmate, is not entitled to much weight.
In Exparte Langley. 325 P.2d 1094 (Okl. Crim
1958), the court indicated that the uncorroborated
and unsupported statements of the petitioner would
not meet the requirements of the standard of burden
of proof to entitle the petitioner to release on habeas
corpus.
In Exparte Mathews, 85 Okl. Crim. 173, 186 P.2d
840 (1947), the Oklahoma court indicated that public
policy did not permit a petitioner on habeas corpus
to supply missing links by his testimony standinG
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alone in a record, but relief must be based upon
something more substantial and the petitioner's testimony must be corroborated by clear and convincinq
proof.
Most recently, in Hicks v. Hand, 189 Kan. 415, 369
P.2d 250 (1962), the Kansas Supreme Court indicated
that the standard of proof necessary to justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is not met by the
uncorroborated and unsupported statements of the
petitioner.
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Consequently, it is submitted that in the instant
case, the facts relating to the advice given the respondent as to counsel at the time of preliminary
hearing is not sufficient to support the respondent's
contention that he was not properly advised. Especially is this so where the Sheriff who was present
testified to the contrary, the respondent's wife offered no evidence to rebut the Sheriff's testimony
on this issue, and where the District Attorney indicated that counsel had, in fact, been appointed at
preliminary hearings in Kane County in the past. It
is submitted that the respondent did not sustain his
burden of proof on the issue of failure to be properly advised as to counsel at the time of preliminary
hearing.
Further, it is submitted that even were this court
to accept the uncorroborated testimony of the respondent, to the effect that he was not advised of his
:ight to counsel at the time of preliminary hearing
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or otherwise afforded an opportunity to have counsel at preliminary hearing, that this would not justify
his release on habeas corpus. It should be remembered that prior to the time the respondent appeared
at preliminary hearing, he confessed his guilt by his
own admission to the Sheriff of Kane County. His appearance at preliminary hearing before the Justice of
the Peace resulted in a waiver of the preliminary
hearing only. No plea was entered nor other action
taken which could have prejudiced the respondent
in any fashion. Under these circumstances, it is
clear that there is no violation of any constitutioncJ
rights.
This was the same issue which was before the
court in State v. Braasch, 119 Utah 450, 229 P.2d 289
(1951). In that case, this court noted that:
"The preliminary hearing is an inquiry, not a trialit is held in the place of the common law grand jury
where the accused is only present if called as a witness and is never represented by counsel."

The court noted that at the preliminary hearing in
the Braasch case, there was no prejudice to the de
fendants from the failure to have counsel and that
they had previously confessed to police officials.
Thus, the court determined that there could be no
prejudice to the defendants.
The facts of that case bear a resemblance to the
evidence in this case when taken in a light ove-;
whelmingly favorable to respondent and even el·
ceed the circumstances favorable to respondent in
the instant case.
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Since the decision of the Braasch case, the
United States Supreme Court has handed down
opinions in two cases which it may be argued hav-'3
some effect upon the Braasch decision. The first is
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961). In that case,
the court held that arraignment could be a "critical
stage," when, as in Alabama, the defendant, if he is
to raise the defense of insanity at all, must raise it or
make a plea of abatement or other motions of procedural concern. The court in the Hamilton case
said that, therefore, arraignment is a "critical stage,"
;equiring the advice as to counsel or the appointment of counsel. The Hamilton case is entirely distinguishable from the situation in the present case,
since the defendant here was not obligated to make
any plea of any kind at the time of preliminary hearing, and motions were not lost by the failure to be
raised at the time of preliminary hearing. Further.
since the petitioner subsequently plead guilty, if
that guilty plea was voluntarily and intelligently entered after waiving counsel, there could be no prejudice.
In White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963), the accused, unrepresented by counsel at preliminary
hearing, entered a plea of guilty to a capital offense.
Thereafter, he entered a plea of not guilty at the
time of his arraignment. The plea of guilty that he
entered at the time of preliminary hearing was offered in evidence against him at the time of trial.
The United States Supreme Court said that in view
,.1 the fact that a plea could be entered at the time
'
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of preliminary hearing and was, in fact, entered '
preliminary hearing in the Maryland situation was
a critical stage. Once again, however, that case is
clearly no precedent for the instant fact situation.
The courts have generally recognized that a
preliminary hearing is not a critical stage within the
meaning of Hamilton and White.
In DeToro v. Peppersack. 332 F.2d 341 (4th C!r.
1964), a state prisoner sought a petition of writ o!
habeas corpus from a federal court. The matter came
before the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The
court ruled that under Maryland law, as modified
since the White decision, that a preliminary hearing
was not a critical stage of judicial process and that
defenses not raised were not irretrievably lost.
Therefore, the failure to appoint counsel for the
accused charged with murder did not violate his
constitutional right to counsel. The court stated:
"Despite the very able arguments advanced by coun·
sel for DeToro, we are unable to accept either of
these contentions. We take as our starting point, as
do the parties, Powell v. Alabama, supra, which states
the broad proposition that an accused has the right
to counsel 'at every step in the proceedings again~!
him.' 287 U.S. at 69, 53 S.Ct. at 64. In Powell, this
was taken to mean that the accused has the right to
have counsel appointed sufficiently in in advance ol
trial to make adequate preparation. Later decisions
of the Court have reaffirmed the importance of pre·
trial preparation. In Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444,
446, 60 S.Ct. 321, 322, 84 L.Ed. 377 (1940).
Mr. Justice black warned that:
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'[TJhe denial of opportunity for appointed counsel to confer, to consult with the accused and to
prepare his defense, could convert the appointment of counsel into a sham and nothing more
than a formal compliance with the Constitution's
requirement that an accused be given the assistandce of counsel. The Constitution's guarantee
of assistance of counsel cannot be satisfied by
mere formal appointment.'
While Hamilton v. Alabama, supra, and White v.
Maryland, supra, have further extended the right to
counsel prior to trial, we are unable to read them as
extending that right to the extent and in the manner urged by DeToro. In Hamilton, the defendant,
indicated for burglary, and without counsel, entered
a plea of not guilty at arraignment. The Supreme
Court reversed his later conviction, holding that the
defendant had been entitled to counsel since, under
Alabama law, arraignment is 'a critical stage in a
criminal proceeding.' 368 U.S. at 53, 82 S.Ct. at 158.
It was a critical stage, according to the Court, because
certain defenses, specifically a plea of insanity, a plea
in abatement, and a motion to quash based on an improperly drawn grand jury, not raised at arraignment,
were considered waived.
In White, the accused was without counsel at a preliminary hearing. Unlike arraignment under Alabama
law, a preliminary hearing under Maryland law is
not, in and of itself, a critical stage in the judicial
process. Defenses not raised at a preliminary hearing
are not irretrievably lost and may be raised later. In
the context of the particular facts of White, however,
the Court was persuaded that White's preliminary
hearing had been a critical stage. This was so because
White's plea of guilty, taken at the preliminary hearing and subsequently withdrawn, was introduced into
evidence against him during trial. On this ground, the
Court reversed the conviction.
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DeToro calls our attention to what he considers to be
the key sentence of the case:
'For petitioner entered a plea before the magistrate and that plea was taken at a time when he
had no counsel.' 373 U.S. at 60, 83 S.Ct. 1051.
The district court, we think, effectively brought the
above sentence into the proper prospective:
'This sentence cannot be read out of context. It
must relate to the case before the Court, namely
that the "plea" was "guilty", and it was offered
in evidence at the trial.' 222 F.Supp. at 624.
In our view, Hamilton and White teach that an ac·
cused is denied rights afforded him under the sixth
amendment when he is subjected to an arraignment
or to a preliminary hearing without the assistance of
counsel, where events transpire that are likely to
prejudice his ensuing trial. The court, in each case,
refused to speculate as to whether in fact prejudice
actually accrued.
Thus, the thrust of Powell's admonition that an ac·
cused has a right to counsel 'at every step in the proceedings against him,' as borne out by subsequent
decisions, including Hamilton and White, seems io
be that if the effectiveness of legal assistance ulti·
mately furnished an accused is likely to be prejudiced
by its prior denial, the earlier period may be deemed
a critical stage in the judicial process and a conviction obtained in such circumstances is rendered in·
valid. We find nothing in the Supreme Court de·
cisions, however, that would permit us to extend the
duty of the State to appoint counsel in proceedin~'
where even the likelihood of later prejudice arising
from the failure to appoint is absent."

It should be noted that the United States Cou:'
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of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Latham v. Crause,
320 F.2d 120 (1963), handed down subsequent to both
White and Hamilton, ruled that an accused has no
constitutional right to be furnished counsel at a preliminary hearing in a state court capital case. In that
case, two individuals by the names of Latham and
York were responsible for a series of killings
throughout the United States, and were tried and
convicted of murder in Kansas after being apprehended in Utah. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
relied on its previous decision in Utah v. Sullivan,
227 F.2d 511 (10th Cir. 1952). It stated:

l~

"The first contention is that petitioners were entitled
to have counsel appointed for them prior to the preliminary examination. Heavy reliance is placed on the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Gideon v. Wainright, Corrections Director, 372 U.S.
385, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799. That case concerned
the right of an accused to counsel at trial-not at a
preliminary hearing. In State of Utah v. Sullivan, 10
Cir., 227 F.2d 511, 513, certiorari denied, sub nom.
Braasch v. Utah, 350 U.S. 973, 76 S.Ct. 449, 100
L.Ed. 844, we held that in circumstances where an accused did not enter a plea of guilty at a preliminary
hearing, did not make a confession, did not testify
and did not say anything of an incriminating nature,
the failure to furnish counsel at such hearing did not
abridge the accused's fundamental constitutional
rights. That decision is controlling here. No claim is
made of any incriminating statements or acts of nation. All they did was to waive the right to a preliminary hearing. Prejudice is asserted on the ground
that counsel would have forceci the prosecution to
disclose at least some of its evidence. The point is
not well taken as more than a month in advance uf
trial copies of the confessions and lists of the prosecu-
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tion witnesses were given defense counsel. Our conclusions in State of Utah v. Sullivan are supported bv
the decisions of other circuits. We find nothing in
Gideon v. Wainright which requires a review of the
decision in State of Utah v. Sullivan."

Further, most recently, Loato v. Cox. 344 F.2d
916 (10th Cir. 1965), the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap.
peals in a percuriam opinion adhered to its position.
The court noted that the preliminary proceedings
were entirely independent of the prisoner's formal
arraignment and sentencing, and at the time of preliminary hearing, the prisoner had already signed a
statement. He appeared before a justice of the
peace without counsel and thereafter at the time of
arraignment entered a plea of guilty. The court con·
eluded the prisoner was in no way deprived of any
constitutional right. This case seems to be rather
directly in point for authority in the instant case thct
if McGuffey was adequately appraised of counsel
at the time of arraignment and intelligently waived
the same, he could not complain of any defect at
the time of preliminary hearing.
A similar case is United States v. Rundle, 349
F.2d 952 (3rd Cir. 1965).
In Vol. II, No. 4, of the Defender News Letter,
July 6, 1965, there is an excellent discussion of the
right to counsel at preliminary hearing. It is noted:
"Some courts have understood the White case tri
mean that the absence of counsel at the prelimimin
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hearing is not a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights, if the absence of counsel is not, in the
eyes of the court, prejudicial."
Thus, in People v. Daniels, 199 N.E.2d 33 (Ill. App.
1964), an Illinois appellate court saw no deprivation
of the accused's right to counsel, since:
'there is neither a claim or any showing that the
absence of counsel at the preliminary hearing or
a failure of an earlier appointment of counsel in
any manner prejudiced the defendant or in any
way adversely affected or contaminated the subsequent proceedings in the case.'"

The same newsletter notes:
"Other courts have found there to be no constitutional injury in the failure to appoint counsel where
no plea offered at the preliminary hearing could be
offered in evidence at the trial *** ."

In United States ex rel. Cooper v. Reineke. 333
F.2d 608 (2nd Cir. 1964), the United States Court of
Appeals reasoned that the preliminary hearing in
Connecticut could not be deemed a critical stage.
The court stated:
"The Connecticut hearing in probable cause has been
accurately characterized as a mere 'inquest' made to
determine the existence of probable cause, and to
discharge the accused if none exist * **. The finding
of probable cause is not final and it cannot be used
against the accused on trial before the superior court.

•••

The Connecticut hearing in probable cause cannot,
therefore, be characterized as critical as in the arraign-
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ment in Alabama. Indeed, it can hardly be termed a
proceeding against the accused. To the contrary, it
appears to operate entirely for the accused's benefit.
And the mere fact that an accused is required to
plead does not, in itself, demand the contrary conclusion where the plea entered is a self-serving denial
of guilt. At trial, appellant had every opportunity to
present any events that was available initially."

Further, in Freeman v. State, 392 P.2d 542 (Ida.
1964), the Supreme Court of Idaho stated:
"While it is recognized that an accused has a right
to counsel at every stage of the proceedings, we do
not understand this to mean that he must be so rep·
resented in the preliminary processes which take
p 1 a c e primarily for the purpose of ascertaining
whether a crime has been committed and whether
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the ac·
cused has committed it, and particularly, where no
prejudice has befallen him."

Numerous decisions from other courts from
other states support the proposition urged in this
brief.
Thus, in Montgomery v. State, 176 So.2d 33l
(Fla. 1965), the court ruled that a preliminary hear
ing was not a critical stage in Florida. Defendant
had not been informed of his right to counsel ai
arraignment before the magistrate on preliminary
hearing.
In State v. Cox, 193 Kan. 571, 396 P.2d 326 (1964)
the Kansas Supreme Court ruled that the lack of reP
resentation by counsel at the time of preliminar'
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hearing did not violate the constitutional rights cf
the defendant who did not request appointment and
made no claim that there was any particular prejudice at the time of his trial from the failure to have
counsel at the time of preliminary hearing. The Supreme Court of Kansas cited the Tenth Circuit Court
case in Latham v. Crause. supra, and indicated that
the purpose of a preliminary hearing in Kansas was
comparable to Utah in that it was an inquiry to determine probable cause and nothing more.
A similar result was reached by the New Mexico Supreme Court in French v. Cox, 74 N.M. 593,
396 P.2d 423 (1964).
In State v. Jackson. 400 P.2d 774 (Wash. 1964),
the Washington Supreme Court indicated that the
right to counsel extends only to critical stages in
the judicial process and that the critical point is to
be determined both from the nature of the proceedings and from what actually occurs. The court there
found that the preliminary hearing was not a trial in
the sense that one could be found guilty, but was a
mere inquest made to determine the existence of
probable cause; and that since nothing that occurred
at the preliminary hearing could be used against
the defendant, it was not a critical stage which would
warrant the appointment of counsel. The court carefully distinguished the Hamilton and White cases
on the same basis that other cases heretofore cited
and discussed have distinguished their application.
A similar result was reached again by the

Kansas Supreme Court in the case of-State v. Black·
smith, 194 Kan. 643, 400 P,2d 743 (1965). In that case,
the court further held [-referring to a previous
Kansas case-J:
"That any so-called alleged 'irregularity' pertaining
to a preliminary examination is deemed to be waived
where a defendant enters a voluntary plea of guilty
in the district· court."

This case is again precedent for the conclusion that
the trial court in the case now before the court committed error in finding that the preliminary hearing
circumstances justified the release of the respondent
on habeas corpus.
The Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Schu·
macher, 97 Ariz. 354, 400 P.2d 584 (1965), also reached
the same conclusion as the New Mexico and Kansc.s
courts. Further, the Arizona court relied upon the
decision of the Nevada Supreme Court in Applica·
tion of Hoff, 393 P.2d 619 (Nev. 1964). Thus, almost
every state surrounding Utah has adopted the position that this court ·recognized in the case of State v.
Braasch, supr~. -.
In Poris v. State, 195 Kan. 313, 403 P.2d 959 (1965),
the Kansas Supreme Court ruled again that an in·
digent defendant has no constitutional right to be
ftirnished'court-appoiilted c::ounsel at his preliminarv
hea.dn<{
.
·
, :;A:"~i~ilar
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reached in the decision ol
State v. Atkins, 195 Kan. 182,403 P.2d 962.(1965).
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In Butler v. Rundle, 206 A.2d 283 (Pa. 1965), the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that a preliminary hearing was not a critical stage requiring
the appointment of counsel for an indigent defendant. Pennsylvania also reached the same result
in James v. Russell, 207 A.2d 792 (Pa. 1965).
The Ohio Court in Bussey v. Maxwell, 202 N.E.2d
698 (Ohio 1964), ruled that a preliminary hearing was
not a critical stage where its only purpose was in determining whether the defendant should be held
for arraignment in the court of general jurisdiction.
It would substantially burden the brief of the
appellant to point out the other numerous cases
which have reached similar conclusions. Many of
the cases are collected in the Defender's Newsletter
referred to above. It is submitted, however, from ail
these authorities, it should be overwhelmingly apparent that the trial court in this case erroneously
determined that the respondent was entitled to release on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, if
there was a failure to advise him of his rights to
counsel at the time of preliminary hearing.
CONCLUSION
It is apparent from an analysis of the record in
this case that there was no factual basis sufficient
to support the trial court's findings and determinations. Further, the trial court made seriously er-
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roneous errors of law in deciding whether the respondent was entitled to release by habeas corpus.
The facts of this case clearly demonstrate tha.t
the respondent voluntarily entered his plea of guilty.
Further, the facts when taken against the burden
of proof which the respondent must have
maintained at the trial court in order to justify his
release, conclusively demonstrates that there was no
factual basis for habeas corpus.
It is therefore submitted that this court should
reverse the decision of the trial court and order the
respondent's application for habeas corpus vacated
and that he be remanded to the custody of the appellant to serve the remaining portion of his
sentence.
Respectfully submitted,

PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
Attorney for Appellant

